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Overview
Australians are paying too much for prescription drugs. The cost 
of this overpayment is at least $1.3 billion a year, or $3.5 million a 
day. This equates to 14 per cent of the entire Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme (PBS) budget. In a time of escalating health 
costs and other strains on the Commonwealth Budget, spending 
on pharmaceuticals could be reduced relatively easily, if there is 
the political will to do so. 
Several good examples show the way. In New Zealand, drug 
prices have plunged dramatically, freeing up money to spend on 
new  drugs  and  other  kinds  of  care.  New  Zealand’s  secret  is  
simple. The Government has taken the politics out of price-setting 
and appointed independent experts to make decisions. It has also 
capped the budget for drugs, which ensures clear priorities and 
tough negotiations with pharmaceutical companies.  
For  Australia’s  PBS,  by  contrast,  decisions  on  drug  pricing  are  
opaque and unconstrained by a budget. Key decisions are made 
by a committee inside the Department of Health and Ageing that 
includes among its six members two representatives of drug 
companies. They have little interest in keeping prices low.  
In New Zealand, politicians decide how much is spent on drugs in 
total, then independent experts negotiate prices. In Australia, 
expert judgements come first but can be overridden by political 
decisions. No one assesses how much we should spend overall. 
As a result, our wholesale prices for identical drugs are now more 
than  six  times  New  Zealand’s.  In  some  cases,  they  are  more  than  
20 times higher.  
One drug alone, atorvastatin, has cost the Australian Government 
and individual patients more than $700 million a year. In its 40 mg 
form, the PBS paid more than $51 for a box of 30 tablets. New 
Zealand pays AU $5.80 for a box of 90 tablets. Adopting New 
Zealand prices for atorvastatin would have saved the PBS more 
than $1.4 million a day in 2011-12. Patients who paid full co-
payments would have saved $22 on each box of tablets.  
This report proposes three changes to get pharmaceutical prices 
under control. The first is to establish a truly independent expert 
board.  Like  New  Zealand’s  Pharmaceutical  Management  Agency,  
it would manage pharmaceutical pricing within a defined budget.  
The second and vital change is to pay far less for generic drugs, 
which can be bought for low prices because they are off-patent. In 
Australia drug companies must cut prices by 16 per cent when a 
patent expires. Many countries require much bigger cuts. Canada 
has mandatory cuts of 82 per cent for some drugs. Australia 
should require a cut of at least 50 per cent, then benchmark 
prices against  the  world’s  best. This might seem unrealistic. But 
Australia’s  public  hospitals  already  pay  low  prices.  Like  New  
Zealand, one  state’s  prices  are  only  a  sixth  of  those  on  the  PBS.   
Down the line, a third reform should encourage people to use 
cheaper but similar pharmaceuticals, which could save at least 
$550 million a year more.  
The pricing agreement between the Government and drug 
companies expires in the middle of next year. Now is the time to 
make  changes  that  will  end  Australia’s  bad  drug  deal.
Australia’s  bad  drug  deal 
 
Grattan Institute 2013  3  
 
Table of contents 
Overview ............................................................................................ 2 
1. Growing costs, high prices ........................................................... 4 
2. A Kiwi comparison ....................................................................... 7 
3. One country, many prices .......................................................... 10 
4. How pharmaceutical pricing works now ..................................... 13 
5. The solution: a better way to buy ............................................... 19 
6. Possible concerns ..................................................................... 27 
Conclusion ....................................................................................... 33 
Methodological appendix ................................................................. 34 
References ...................................................................................... 41 
 
  
Australia’s  bad  drug  deal 
 
Grattan Institute 2013  4  
1. Growing costs, high prices
How much do we pay? 
Access to pharmaceuticals is crucial to good health care. On 
average, almost nine out of ten visits to a general practice involve 
a prescription.1 Therapeutic advances mean that drug treatment 
has improved and extended the lives of many Australians. But it 
comes at a cost. 
Australians spend more than $18 billion a year on medications.2 
This report is about drugs that the Government subsidises – drugs 
that are included on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS). 
These drugs cost patients and the Government more than $9 
billion a year. 
For most drugs on the PBS, patients pay up to $36.10 ($5.90 for 
concession card-holders, who are generally prescribed more 
drugs than the rest of the population). The Government pays the 
rest. If someone spends more than a certain amount in one year, 
their  payment  (or  ‘co-payment’)  is  reduced.3 As a result, the 
Government pays more than 80 per cent of the cost of PBS drugs.  
 
                                            
1 Britt, et al. (2012) 
2 Figures are from 2010-11. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2012b) 
3 This is the Safety Net program. The threshold is $1390.60 ($354 for 
concession card holders). Co-payments are reduced to the concessional level, 
and for concession card-holders they are removed altogether. Cost of drugs 
provided  to  people  covered  by  the  Safety  Net  is  in  the  ‘Other’  category  in   
Figure 1. Other expenditure in that figure also includes PBS support for highly 
specialised drugs provided in hospitals. 
These costs are rising. In real terms, Government spending on 
the PBS grew by six per cent a year in the five years to 2010-11.4 
The pressure this puts on the budget is seen in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Expenditure on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, 
1982-83 to 2011-12 (2011-12 dollars) 
 
Source: Duckett and Willcox (2011) 
 
 
                                            
4 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2012b).This figure is for the five 
years to 2010-11 (inclusive).  
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How does Australia compare? 
Despite the importance of pharmaceutical expenditure, there has 
been  little  official  focus  on  how  Australia’s  prices  compare  
internationally. The exception was a 2001 Productivity 
Commission report that found Australian prices to be “much  lower  
than those in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
Sweden  but  closer  to  those  in  France,  Spain  and  New  Zealand.”5 
When the Productivity Commission report was published, 
Australian prices were indeed substantially lower than those in the 
USA. But even  then,  they  were  not  the  world’s  best. Spain and 
France paid marginally less for innovative products. Spain and 
New Zealand paid marginally less for drugs that were no longer 
covered by patents. A 2005 study reached a similar conclusion to 
the Productivity Commission.6 
Since  then,  Australia’s  relative  pricing  has  deteriorated sharply. 
While other countries have contained growth in prices – and in 
some cases cut prices dramatically – Australia has not. A recent 
report from the London-based Office of Health Economics showed 
that we used to rank among the countries with the lowest prices, 
but our prices are now among the highest (see Figure 2). Recent 
OECD data also show that Australia pays more than most 
countries for pharmaceuticals.7  
Relative  to  other  countries,  Australia’s  prices  are  particularly  high  
for generic drugs, or drugs that are no longer under patent (see 
                                            
5 Productivity Commission (2001) 
6 Sweeny (2005) 
7 O’Neill, et al. (2012) 
Box 1 for definitions), with significant cumulative costs.8 Ideally, 
competition between suppliers should cause generic drug prices 
to  fall.  However,  this  doesn’t  always  happen.  A  relatively  limited  
number of suppliers, and tightly regulated prices, can lead to 
companies keeping prices high.9 
Figure 2: Australia’s  pharmaceutical  prices  relative  to  selected  
countries, 2007-2011 
 
Note: Four other countries had higher-than-Australian prices in 2008 and lower prices in 
2011 (2011 proportion of Australian prices in brackets): Finland (72%), Italy and Spain 
(71%) and the Netherlands (82%). USA prices were consistently the highest (from 195% to 
268% relative to Australia). Source: Grattan Institute analysis of OHE data 
                                            
8 Roughead, et al. (2007); Bulfone (2009); Clarke and Fitzgerald (2010); Morgan 
and Boothe (2010); Clarke (2012). 
9 Bulfone (2009) notes that current PBS pricing arrangements inform firms of 
competitor price reduction offers, limiting benefits to companies of competition 
on price. See footnote 43 for more information. 
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Of  course,  drug  prices  aren’t the only factor that influences 
pharmaceutical expenditure. Population health, demographics, 
and clinical choices are all important. But of all the ways to limit 
pharmaceutical spending, cutting prices is the quickest and the 
easiest. It can save a lot of money that is being wasted and if it is 
managed the right way, cutting drug prices poses very little risk to 
health.  
To estimate how much we could save by reducing drug prices, the 
following chapters look at the prices paid in New Zealand, and by 
public hospitals in two Australian States. Subsequent chapters 
explain how we set our prices, and how we can do it better 
without reducing health care quality or access. Finally, we discuss 
potential concerns our recommendations might raise, and how 
negative side-effects can be avoided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1: What are patented and generic drugs? 
Drug pricing is complex. Developing truly new drugs can be a long 
and  expensive  undertaking.  The  journey  from  ‘bench  to  bedside’  
involves many hurdles, with promising inventions in the laboratory 
often failing to succeed when tested on the population. Drugs 
must also be approved for safety and effectiveness, adding further 
delays and costs. 
To recover these costs, discoveries can be patented. Patents 
effectively give an exclusive licence to manufacture, and allow the 
manufacturer to charge higher prices for the 20-year patent 
period. Because these 20 years include the approval process, 
drugs will not be on the market for the whole time they are under 
patent.  
After the patent has expired, other companies can use the 
intellectual  property  behind  the  drug  and  bring  identical  ‘generic’  
copies  (as  opposed  to  the  ‘patented’  version)  to  market.  The  
patent-holder might also offer a generic version of the drug. 
Sometimes patent-holders attempt to extend patent protection 
beyond 20 years by patenting different aspects of their products 
(the coating of a capsule, or a combination of active ingredients, 
for  example).  This  is  known  as  ‘evergreening’  and  is  currently  
being investigated by a Government inquiry.10 
 
 
                                            
10 Commonwealth of Australia (2012). 
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2. A Kiwi comparison
A comparison with our neighbour, New Zealand, shows how much 
money we waste by paying too much for drugs.11 Grattan Institute 
analysis of 2011-12 data found staggering differences in the 
prices paid in each country.  
We looked at the prices of individual drug-dose combinations 
(“doses”)  – for example, of atorvastatin 40 mg. We analysed the 
top 73 doses that are prescribed the most often, and that account 
for the most expenditure.12 
We compared prices paid here with prices in New Zealand, as 
reported by its Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 
PHARMAC.13 For the 11 Australian doses not listed on New 
Zealand’s  schedule, a comparison was made with a near-
equivalent identified in the Australian Medicines Handbook. 
If  Australia  adopted  New  Zealand’s  prices  for  62  identical  doses  
available in both countries, it would save $1.1 billion a year.14 This 
                                            
11 Spinks and Richardson (2011) also found a large disparity in prices using 
2007 data. Grattan Institute analysis uses 2012 data, which includes the impact 
of recent reforms, including price disclosure. 
12 This list combines the top 50 drug-dose combinations by prescription volume, 
and the top 50 by total expenditure. Because of the overlap between these 
categories, there are 73 doses on the final list, and 54 different drugs. 
13 Our approach is consistent with guidance on international comparisons. See 
Machado, et al. (2011). PBS prices were for October 2012, PHARMAC for 
January 2013. 
14 Of these 62, seven combine the same drugs in a different ratio. They account 
for only $7 million of savings. See methodological appendix for more information. 
Savings estimates all relate to total PBS expenditure. Data are not available to 
distinguish between public (taxpayer) and private (patient out-of-pocket cost) 
savings. 
would not involve any change in treatment patterns. Another $590 
million could be saved if substitutions were made for the 
remaining  11  doses  in  our  ‘top  73’  list  that  are  not  available  in  
New Zealand.  
These savings are based on data from one year. Savings may 
vary from year to year as prices change, prescribing changes, and 
new drugs come on the market. However, our estimates are very 
conservative in two respects. Firstly, our analysis only considers 
Australia’s  top  73  doses,  which  account  for  about  43  per  cent  of  
PBS expenditure. Secondly, greater savings could be achieved if 
we allowed greater quantities per prescription as New Zealand 
does. Using less conservative assumptions, estimated savings 
could be even higher (see methodological appendix for more 
information). 
New  Zealand’s  PHARMAC  negotiates  discounts  on  published  
prices amounting to an average of 17 per cent of expenditure 
(drug companies are prepared to discount their product if the price 
is kept secret, in order not to affect prices in other markets). The 
discounts for individual drugs are not public, so we have not taken 
them into account in our analysis. Australia also negotiates price 
discounts below published prices. Since these discounts are not 
publically released they have not been taken into account in our 
analysis either. However, they would have to be exceptionally 
large  (and  well  above  New  Zealand’s)  to  have  a  significant  impact  
on the savings we have estimated. 
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Figure 3: Estimated annual savings from adopting New Zealand's 
pharmaceutical prices, 2011-12 
 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis based on PHARMAC (2012b); PBS (2012) 
For the 73 doses we compared, Australian wholesale prices are 
eight  times  higher  than  New  Zealand’s.  For  identical  drugs  – a 
more conservative comparison – our prices are six times higher. 
As Figure 4 shows, the price differences are not random. Our 
prices are highest precisely when the most money is at stake: for 
the drugs we use often, and spend the most on. For the top 10 
doses on the PBS by volume, we pay an average of more than 10 
times  New  Zealand’s  prices.  For  the  10  doses  that  cost  us  the  
most,  the  average  is  almost  13  times  New  Zealand’s  prices.  
Figure 4: Ex-manufacturer prices for identical drugs as multiples of 
New  Zealand’s,  by  volume  (top)  and  total  cost  (bottom),  2011-12 
 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis 
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Box 2: Atorvastatin – a blockbuster budget buster 
Australia spent more than $700 million in 2011-12 on a single 
drug: atorvastatin, marketed by Pfizer under the name Lipitor. 
Atorvastatin lowers blood cholesterol and is prescribed to reduce 
the risk of heart disease. The Government cost was more than 
$570 million, while patients paid the rest. 
In Australia, atorvastatin is most commonly prescribed in packs of 
30 40-milligram tablets. Although generic versions have been 
introduced, the price paid by the PBS in October 2012 was still 
high: $51.59 per box.  
Atorvastatin has been off-patent for more than a year, so prices 
are tumbling around the world. In New Zealand, Pfizer supplies its 
generic equivalent, Zarator, for AU$5.80 for a box of 90 tablets. 
This is less than four per cent of the Australian price per pill.  
If  Australia  paid  New  Zealand’s  price  for  Zarator  with  current  
pharmacy mark-ups, the price to the customer would plummet to 
$14.10. A patient currently paying the maximum $36.10 for his or 
her prescription would save $22 for every box. Assuming they 
bought one box a month, this is an annual saving of $264. 
With New Zealand prices (and current pharmacy mark-ups), the 
Government would pay nothing at all for non-concessional 
patients below the Safety Net. On current prescription volumes, 
and across the most commonly prescribed forms of atorvastatin, 
New Zealand prices would save more than $1.4 million every day. 
An ad-hoc price reduction in December 2012 (unrelated to the 
usual price disclosure cycle) bought the ex-manufacturer price of 
atorvastatin down by 25%. This contrasts with the 96% cut that 
would have brought the price into line with New Zealand’s.   
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3. One country, many prices
We  don’t  have  to  look  overseas  for  examples  of  better  drug  
prices. Public hospitals buy drugs outside the PBS. In most 
states, purchasing negotiations for all public hospitals have been 
centralised, either in a specific body for the health sector, or as 
part of broader public sector purchasing arrangements. As the 
prices in two states show, public hospitals are getting a much 
better deal than the Commonwealth Government and the general 
public.  
Grattan Institute compared PBS prices with the prices paid by 
public hospitals in Western Australia. Hospitals  don’t  purchase  all  
the drugs on the PBS, so we only compared prices for identical 
drugs that are bought by public hospitals  and  are  also  on  our  ‘top  
73’  list  for  the  PBS.  In  the  case  of  Western  Australia,  that  means  
39 drugs. If the PBS adopted the cheaper prices that public 
hospitals in Western Australia pay, it would save an estimated 
$750 million. 
Public hospitals in another state – which cannot be named 
because data were provided on condition of confidentiality – get 
an even better deal. If the PBS matched the prices paid by public 
hospitals in this state for 59 identical drugs, there would be 
savings of nearly $1.2 billion each year.  
Most of these savings come from lower generic drug prices (see 
Figure 5).15 This shows that, even compared with other prices 
                                            
15 All savings estimates in this chapter are based on identical drugs. See the 
methodological appendix for more information. 
paid in Australia, PBS prices for generic drugs are extremely 
inflated. 
We did not obtain information about prices paid by purchasing 
bodies in all States and Territories. However, we could also 
expect large savings if the PBS adopted their prices. In 2010, 
benchmarking of drug prices paid by purchasers in six states and 
territories found low variation.16 By contrast, there is a huge gap 
between the prices paid in the states we studied and prices paid 
by the PBS (see Figure 5) – a gap that equates to wasted 
expenditure of between $750 million and $1.2 billion a year.  
Putting the three comparisons together (New Zealand and the two 
public  hospital  systems),  paints  a  stark  picture  of  the  PBS’s  
extremely high prices. As Figure 6 shows, on average the 
wholesale cost of PBS drugs is over eight times the lowest price 
in our comparisons – for 16 doses, our prices are 10 times higher. 
The PBS only gets the lowest price for five drug doses, none of 
which yields substantial savings relative to New Zealand or public 
hospitals.17 
                                            
16 We did not review the report from the Australian National Health 
Benchmarking Program, but according to a Victorian Auditor-General’s  report,  it  
found a price gap of only 1.7 per cent between the second-best performer and 
the average. See Victorian Auditor-General (2011) 
17 Four had prescription volumes of less than one million a year. One 
(lercanidipine hydrochloride) was not used by any comparator. For the leukemia 
drug  imatinib,  the  PBS  price  was  around  $100  cheaper  than  New  Zealand’s,  but  
this drug had less than 14,000 prescriptions. The other drugs were only 
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Figure 5: Estimated savings from adopting prices from New 
Zealand, public hospitals in WA and another state, 2011-12 
 
 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis based on Contracts WA (2012); PBS (2012); PHARMAC 
(2012b) and confidential data 
                                                                                    
marginally cheaper. The PBS did get the best deal on prescription aspirin, at 
$7.88 compared  to  New  Zealand’s  $8.07.   
Figure 6: PBS prices as multiples of benchmark comparators, 2011-
12 
 
Note: This chart represents the 58 identical doses for which the benchmark model was 
cheaper than the PBS. Only 39 drugs where the PBS cost is more than twice that of the 
comparator are displayed, although the average is for all 58 doses. The price of one drug, 
olanzapine, is 64 times higher on the PBS than in Western Australian public hospitals. 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis 
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All these comparisons are conservative. The range of drugs used 
in hospitals is far narrower than those covered by the PBS. The 
volume of drugs being negotiated is also much smaller (nationally, 
PBS purchases are five times public hospital drug purchases).18 
Because state purchasers do not have the same economies of 
scale and negotiating power as a national purchaser, Australia 
might be able to pay even lower prices at a national level. 
                                            
18 In 2010-11, public hospital expenditure on drugs was 21% of government PBS 
expenditure, $1.83 billion versus $8.72 billion. See Department of Health and 
Ageing (2010a); Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2012a). 
 
Box 3: Pill pricing in Perth  
Maria (not a real person) is a 63-year old Perth woman recovering 
from breast cancer, with a history of ischaemic heart disease.  
She is prescribed anastrozole, a breast cancer drug. Although 
anastrozole came off patent more than two years ago, it costs 
$152 for 30 pills. Maria pays the maximum co-payment of $36.10, 
while the Government pays the rest. She also takes clopidogrel 
with aspirin for her heart, which costs the Government $75 for 
each box. Again, she pays $36.10 of this while the Government 
pays the remainder. 
A nearby public hospital buys anastrozole for $12, and buys 
clopidogrel for $11. If pharmacies bought the drugs for these 
prices, after mark-ups they would cost Maria only $27 and $24 
each.  
These cheaper prices bring both drugs below the maximum co-
payment. So instead of paying $36.10 for each script ($72.20), 
Maria now only pays $51 for both her medications – a saving of 
$22. Meanwhile, the PBS saves $227 each time Maria visits the 
pharmacist. Maria will also take longer to reach the Medicare 
Safety Net, resulting in further savings for the PBS. 
 
  
Australia’s  bad  drug  deal 
 
Grattan Institute 2013 13  
4. How pharmaceutical pricing works now
Australia has high drug prices because we purchase 
pharmaceuticals the wrong way. Unlike in New Zealand, the 
process of listing individual drugs involves political decisions at 
the highest level: Cabinet. And while independent experts 
provide advice, the key pricing body is a six-person internal 
committee within the public service, which includes two industry 
representatives.  
Crucially, PBS expenditure is uncapped. There is no fixed ‘drug  
budget’ to force decision makers to contain costs, and to ensure 
that subsidies are spent on the most cost-effective options. 
Australia’s  process 
Before a drug is listed on the PBS, it is assessed for quality, 
safety and efficacy by the Therapeutic Goods Administration, 
then for cost-effectiveness and clinical relevance by the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee. Once a drug is 
over these hurdles, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing 
Authority (the Pricing Authority) determines the maximum price 
that can be charged, and how much the Government will pay 
manufacturers or importers through the PBS. 
The Pricing Authority is a non-statutory body established by 
ministerial direction. Of the six members of the committee, two 
are industry lobbyists from Medicines Australia and the Generic 
Medicines Industry Association. There is an independent chair 
and one representative from the health department, and one 
from the Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research 
and Tertiary Education. There is also one consumer nominee, 
currently from the Consumers Health Forum.  
The Pricing Authority’s  recommendations  are  far  from  
transparent.19 Nevertheless, they may take into account a range 
of factors, including cost-effectiveness (based on the 
manufacturer’s  proposed  price), prices of similar drugs and 
alternative brands, and prices in comparable countries.20  
The Pricing Authority makes recommendations on drug pricing 
to the Minister for Health. If the total cost of listing the new drug 
is estimated at less than $10 million a year, it has been agreed 
that the listing will go ahead.21 If the estimated cost is more than 
$10 million a year, the final decision is made by Cabinet (see 
Figure 7). Like the Health Minister, Cabinet can accept or reject 
recommendations, or defer listing. 
In recent years, changes have been made to try to cut drug 
prices. In 2005, mandatory price reductions were introduced for 
new generic drugs. After a patent expires, the first new, bio-
equivalent drug added to the PBS had to be at least 12.5 per 
cent cheaper than the existing drug. This reduction was 
increased to 16 per cent in 2010, but is still much smaller than 
the cuts required in many other countries (discussed below). 
                                            
19 Robertson, et al. (2009) 
20 Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority (2010). For some drugs, pricing 
decisions also take into account potential volumes of PBS prescriptions for the 
drug, and prices may be adjusted if volumes differ from pre-listing estimates. 
21 The agreement is between the Government and Medicines Australia. 
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Figure 7: The process for setting drug prices 
 
Source: Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority (2009) 
 
Another improvement is that since 2007 the prices that 
pharmacies pay for drugs must be disclosed.22 Previously, 
discounts that manufacturers and wholesalers gave to 
pharmacies were not taken into account when PBS prices were 
set.  
One example is the lipid-lowering drug Simvastatin. Before April 
2012, pharmacists were getting steep discounts that were not 
considered when setting PBS prices. Pharmacists paid only 
$17.52 for a standard-dose box, but received $31.82 from the 
Government. This resulted in a gross profit of 45 per cent – a 
huge and unintended windfall for pharmacies, paid by the 
taxpayer.23  
Price disclosure is bearing some fruit. The next round of 
adjustments will come into force in April 2013. The prices of 62 
drugs will fall by an average of one quarter. Prices for eight 
drugs will fall by more than 50 per cent.24 But almost all the 
reductions fall well short of what is needed to bring drug prices 
in line with those paid in New Zealand, and by Australian public 
hospitals (see Figure 8). 
 
                                            
22 The scheme was expanded in 2010 and now covers the whole PBS. 
23 Georges and Palaghia (2012). Nicholson (2013) also reports very large 
discounts to pharmacies, but these are still less than the savings that would 
accrue to Government and consumers through the benchmark model 
proposed in this report. Clarke (2012) has also demonstrated the very large 
windfalls accruing to pharmacies from manufacturer price discounts. 
24 Department of Health and Ageing (2013) 
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Figure 8: Benchmark prices and Australian prices with reductions 
from price disclosure 
 
Note: Benchmark prices are the lowest price out of the PBS, New Zealand, or the two 
public hospital purchasers we assessed. 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis 
 
The policy has other important limitations, including a significant 
time lag. As shown in Figure 9, data collection, analysis, 
recommendations and adjustments take a minimum of 18 
months.25 Over this period, the real prices pharmacies pay may 
fall further, but they cannot be adjusted until at least a year and 
a half later. In the meantime the taxpayer and patients face 
unnecessary costs.  
The long delay in passing on the benefits of price reductions to 
consumers has important consequences, especially for people 
who pay the full $36.10 co-payment for their prescription. An 
estimated  nine  per  cent  of  Australians  don’t  buy  the  drugs  they 
have been prescribed due to cost.26 
So  far,  prices  haven’t  fallen  far  enough  and  price  disclosure  is  
likely to become less effective over time. The policy is extremely 
complex to administer, leaving room for error and legal 
challenges. Recently, a drug manufacturer successfully 
challenged  the  Government’s  calculations  in  court,  resulting  in  a  
price reduction being cancelled, and another limited.27 The 
ruling may have implications for other price reductions. 
 
 
 
                                            
25 By agreement between the Government and Medicines Australia. 
26 ABS (2012). This problem is faced disproportionately by younger and sicker 
adults – see The Commonwealth Fund (2011). 
27 IHS (2013) 
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Figure 9: The price disclosure cycle 
 
Source: Adapted from Department of Health and Ageing (2010b) 
 
 
There are signs that manufacturers will try to avoid the impact of 
price disclosure in other ways. One is to provide payments to 
pharmacies that are not directly linked to drug sales (like 
incentives to sign  patients  up  for  drug  company  ‘support  
programs’).28 Another loophole in the rules is already being 
exploited. Data from the first month that a new drug is listed is 
not used in the price disclosure process. During this period, 
pharmacies can receive steep discounts without risking future 
reductions in PBS prices.29 
Flaws in the process 
There have been small, positive changes in how drug prices are 
set. But they will not be enough to make sure the PBS gets 
good drug prices. Fundamental, structural problems with how 
pricing decisions remain. Recent arbitrary decisions about listing 
drugs highlight these issues. 
In 2011, the then Health Minister announced that consideration 
of seven medicines recommended for inclusion on the PBS 
would be deferred, arguing that they did not improve on existing 
treatments.30 The seven medicines were victims of timing. There 
doesn’t  appear  to have been any systematic reason – such as 
                                            
28 In 2011, Pfizer offered pharmacists $7 for each patient the pharmacist 
recruits  to  a  Pfizer  ‘support  program’.  See  Miller (2011). 
29 Commonwealth of Australia (2010). Pharmacists are aware of this loophole, 
Thurecht (2011), and according to Dunlevy (2011) some pharmacists 
purchase a year’s  supply  during  this  month-long period. 
30 Finance and Public Administration Reference Committee (2011) 
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their relative cost-effectiveness relative to drugs already on the 
PBS – for choosing not to list them.31 
Around the same time, it was announced that Cabinet would 
decide on all new drugs listings. Previously, it was only involved 
when forecast expenditure was more than $10 million a year.32 
A Senate Committee concluded there had been: 
…  a  major, unnecessary and unwelcome change in 
government policy. The Government has exchanged a well-
respected, criteria-bound, evidence-based and transparent 
system for a system that is none of these things. Cabinet is 
duplicating an already existing process, albeit without the 
appropriate qualifications or information available to the 
[Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee]. This is 
wasteful. Micromanaging the process in this way also 
represents a poor use of Cabinet's time and is likely to result 
in significant and unacceptable delays.33 
The decision to remove the $10 million threshold for Cabinet 
consideration was later reversed, but it highlights the risk of 
other arbitrary changes in future. More broadly, it is clear that 
pricing decisions are made in the wrong place, by the wrong 
people.  
Deciding on the pricing and listing of individual drugs is a 
specialist, technical task. Even though Cabinet can only accept 
                                            
31 A minimum incremental budget threshold (based on clinical cost-benefit 
analysis) can be justified, but at the start of the evaluation process, not at the 
end. Buyx, et al. (2011) 
32 Finance and Public Administration Reference Committee (2011) 
33 Ibid. 
or reject recommendations, or defer a decision, there is no good 
reason for it to have this role. Certainly, Cabinet should set 
overall spending levels and priorities. It might also set cost-
effectiveness thresholds to guide the listing process. Beyond 
this,  a  confidential  political  body  shouldn’t  micro-manage the 
listing and pricing of specific drugs. 
The advice received by the Minister and Cabinet comes from 
bodies that seem independent, and technically they are. 
However, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority is 
effectively a committee of the Commonwealth Department of 
Health and Ageing. The Department, while part of an 
independent public service, supports and serves the Minister for 
Health, and is not insulated from politics in the same way as are 
statutory bodies such as the Reserve Bank, or PHARMAC in 
New Zealand. 
More troubling is the fact that  unlike  New  Zealand’s  impartial,  
expert  board,  Australia’s  Pricing  Authority  includes  
representatives with direct, vested financial interests 
(representatives of drug companies and generic manufacturers). 
Given its membership, this body is unlikely to focus on keeping 
drug prices in check.  
The whole framework for negotiating prices is governed by a 
political accommodation between the Government and drug 
companies. In a 2010 Memorandum of Understanding, which 
largely relates to the price of generic drugs, the Government 
promised not to introduce any new policies to cut drug prices 
before July 2014: 
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The Commonwealth undertakes not to implement new policy 
to generate price-related savings from the PBS during the 
period of agreement [May 2010 to July 2014], that is, 
measures that would change the ex-manufacturer prices of 
particular medicines, other than that reflected by this MOU.34 
This promise, the seemingly arbitrary decisions by Cabinet, and 
the  high  drug  prices  we  pay  all  indicate  the  process  isn’t  
working. It is opaque, uncertain and expensive, and it assigns 
the wrong roles to politicians and vested interests.   
                                            
34 Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 
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5. The solution: a better way to buy 
A much better process, and much better results, are clearly 
possible.  Grattan’s  analysis  of  prices  paid  by  public  hospitals  
shows that Australia is quite capable of getting better 
pharmaceutical prices. We could do much better, but a flawed 
process is forcing us to pay a high price. 
Other countries have much better ways of buying 
pharmaceuticals. So do the Australian public hospital 
purchasers that we studied. To improve our performance we 
should learn from these examples and use the best approaches 
from around the world.  
Three reforms are needed to get our pharmaceutical prices 
back on track: independent, expert pricing within a defined 
budget; slashing the price of generic drugs; and encouraging 
people to use the most cost-effective medicine. 
We should adopt New  Zealand’s  independent,  expert  
management of drug pricing, as well as a defined budget to 
contain prices. We should also set tougher rules for the price of 
generic drugs. Although we have moved in the right direction by 
setting a mandatory price reduction for new generics, it is a 
small cut compared to those required in many other countries. 
 
 
 
Start by getting the foundations right: independent 
governance and an incentive to save 
For decades, Australian interest rates have been set by the 
Reserve Bank, a truly independent body that, unlike government 
departments, does not report to a minister. A similar model of 
independent decision-making could apply to pharmaceutical 
pricing.  
New Zealand provides a role model: PHARMAC, an 
independent pharmaceutical purchaser (see Box 4). PHARMAC 
has taken a hard-nosed approach in negotiations with drug 
companies, resulting in substantial savings against projected 
expenditures (see Figure 10).35 As well as purchasing and 
listing the prices of pharmaceuticals, PHARMAC is responsible 
for promoting optimal use of drugs. 
Every new drug listed on the PBS increases costs.36 While cost-
benefit analysis of all new drugs is a good policy, budget 
impacts also need to be contained as part of the listing process. 
New  Zealand’s  process  does this well. PHARMAC considers 
both cost effectiveness and total cost when making listing 
decisions.  
PHARMAC has a defined drug budget, so it is forced to make 
trade-offs about where savings will be made to pay for new 
drugs. The defined budget  also  strengthens  PHARMAC’s  hand  
                                            
35 Cumming, et al. (2010); PHARMAC (2012a) 
36 Birch and Gafni (1994) 
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in negotiations with pharmaceutical companies, while its political 
independence reduces political pressure and lobbying to 
politicians to list drugs. 
The result is low prices. PHARMAC has contained growth in 
drug prices. Pharmaceutical expenditure now takes up less of 
the health budget, allowing greater expenditure on other areas 
of health care.37 New Zealand is now a world leader in 
containing drug prices. There is no reason why Australia 
shouldn’t  challenge  New  Zealand  for  that  position.   
Figure 10: Impact of PHARMAC on community pharmacy 
spending, 2000 to 2015 
Source: PHARMAC (2012a) 
                                            
37 Pharmaceutical’s  share  of  health  spending  fell  substantially  from  1996  to  
2006, while it rose in other countries including Australia (1996 to 2005). See 
The Commonwealth Fund (2008). 
Box 4: PHARMAC’s governance 
The New Zealand Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC) 
is established under the Public Health and Disability Act 2000 as a 
Crown entity.38 It is governed by an independent, expert board of six 
people, including three medical practitioners.  
PHARMAC’s principal objective is “to secure for eligible people in 
need of pharmaceuticals, the best health outcomes that are 
reasonably achievable from pharmaceutical treatment and from within 
the amount of funding provided” (emphasis added).39 
The Act requires PHARMAC to “consult on matters that relate to the 
management of pharmaceutical expenditure with any sections of the 
public, groups, or individuals that, in the view of PHARMAC, may be 
affected by decisions on those matters” when it considers it 
appropriate. 
The PHARMAC Board makes pricing decisions independently. 
Authorisation by government ministers is not required. According to a 
recent study, PHARMAC is seen as politically neutral, resistant to 
lobbying, and able  to  contain  medicine  costs.  Because  of  PHARMAC’s  
independence, and strong bipartisan support, the pharmaceutical 
industry  accepts  PHARMAC’s  role  and  both  sides  work  together  
professionally.40 
  
                                            
38 Ministry of Health (2005) 
39 Ibid. Section 47(a) 
40 Ragupathy, et al. (2012) interviewed 20 key informants including doctors, 
pharmacists, members of Parliament, public servants, and people who work at 
PHARMAC and in the pharmaceutical industry. 
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Australia should also  follow  New  Zealand’s  approach  and  
disentangle Cabinet from the PBS listing process. Prices should 
be set by an independent, impartial and expert pricing board, 
with strong membership from the medical profession. Like 
PHARMAC, the new agency should function within a defined 
budget, providing a clear incentive to achieve better pricing. To 
inform its decisions, it should benchmark against prices paid by 
State and Territory purchasers, as well as by national 
purchasers in other countries.41 
Tougher rules on generic pricing 
 
 
Australian prices for generic drugs are extremely high: on 
average more than seven times higher than New Zealand’s  
(Figure 11). Generics account for 89 per cent of the estimated 
savings Australia would make if it adopted New Zealand prices 
for identical drugs.42 
Australia’s  high  prices  cannot  be  justified.  Generally,  companies 
that offer generics did not invent the drug, so they face no 
research and development costs, and the marginal costs of 
pharmaceutical manufacturing are very low. Despite this, 
                                            
41 Benchmarking is an important part of pricing in other countries. In England 
the Department of Health undertakes an annual price comparison which is 
tabled in Parliament, Department of Health (England) (2012). In Canada price 
comparisons are released in the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board 
annual report, see Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (Canada) (2011). 
42 Both comparisons include 56 identical drugs only. In seven cases, the ratio 
of drugs within doses vary. See the methodological appendix for more 
information. 
without strong market regulation generic prices tend to remain 
high.43 
Figure 11: Australian wholesale prices as multiples of New 
Zealand prices, identical drugs, generic and patented, 2011-12 
 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis 
                                            
43 There are several reasons that companies do not compete vigorously on the 
price of generics in many markets. These include relatively high concentration 
of suppliers, heavily regulated prices, consumers being insulated from prices 
by government subsidies, and generally nationally-bounded markets. Bulfone 
(2009) notes that current arrangements, where price reductions are conveyed 
to all participants, limit competition on price. One exception is the USA, which 
has a very large and competitive generics market, with many generic 
suppliers, some of which are owned by retail drug store chains. 
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Many governments have responded by setting rules for the 
price of new generics, capping them at a proportion of the price 
of the original, patented drug.44 Australia requires new generic 
drugs to be at least 16 per cent cheaper than the originator. But 
by international standards, this requirement is timid, and could 
easily be strengthened. 
Many other countries have mandated price reductions that are 
much tougher, as Figure 12 shows. This year Canadian 
provinces have gone the furthest by requiring the price of six 
generic drugs (including atorvastatin) to fall to at least 82 per 
cent below the price of the original, patented drug.45 The 
provinces expect to expand the rule to more drugs in the future. 
The change follows the example of provinces such as Ontario, 
which increased mandatory price reductions for all new generic 
drugs to 75 per cent in 2010. 
There is no good reason to pay more for generics than other 
countries do. Australia should tackle high generic drug prices in 
two ways. First, it should impose a cut of at least 50 per cent on 
generic prices as soon  as  a  drug’s  patent  expires.   
Once this kind of price cap is set, companies tend to leave their 
prices at the regulated limit.46 For this reason, there should be 
                                            
44 Many countries are turning to better pricing of generics for savings, but 
substantial price variation remains, Simoens (2007); Danzon and Furukawa 
(2008). 
45 The Council of the Federation (Canada) (2013). Québec is the only province 
not participating.  
46 Carone, et al. (2012) 
annual benchmarking against the lowest prices paid by any 
national purchaser, following the 50 per cent cut.47  
Figure 12: Price reductions for new generics, selected countries 
 
Notes: Austria imposes additional 15% and 10% cuts for the second and third generics 
that enter the market. In Korea there are 15% cuts for second and subsequent entrants 
(or, if it is lower, the cap is the lowest listed price for entrants 2 to 5, and 85% of the 
lowest listed price for subsequent entrants). For the Czech Republic, reductions are 
usually 55%, although technically the minimum reduction is 20%. Sources: Directorate 
General for Internal Policies (European Parliament) (2010); OECD (2010); Puig-Junoy 
(2010); Izmirlieva and Ando (2012); The Council of the Federation (Canada) (2013).  
                                            
47 In the case of Canada, when several provinces have the same price, this 
price could also be used for benchmarking. Bulfone (2009) has proposed a 
tender rather than benchmarking approach where multiple tenderers could be 
accepted, but tenderers would lock in their bid for a set period, creating a 
strong incentive to compete on price. We have proposed a more regulated 
approach as the savings are more certain. 
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Matching the cheapest price for identical drugs in the three 
jurisdictions studied here – using a benchmarking approach –
would save $1.3 billion a year. This would not involve any 
change in prescribing. These savings would likely grow as many 
‘blockbuster’  drugs  are  due  to  come  off-patent in the next few 
years. 
A future reform: promoting cost-effective choices 
Once changes to generic prices are bedded down, further 
savings could be achieved by encouraging people to use the 
most cost-effective  drug  in  a  ‘therapeutic  group’.  Drugs  in  a  
therapeutic group treat the same problem and have similar 
health and safety outcomes. An existing policy, the Therapeutic 
Group Premium, sets the PBS payment for the cheapest drug in 
some therapeutic groups. If people choose a more expensive 
drug in the group, the PBS contribution remains the same and 
patients make up the difference. Doctors can seek an 
exemption if using the cheapest drug would  put  a  patient’s  
health at risk.48 This policy currently applies to a limited range of 
drugs.  
Once it is well-established,  Australia’s  new  drug  pricing  board  
could gradually expand this approach to more therapeutic 
groups. All the drugs in each therapeutic group would still be 
subsidised, but the costs of using a more expensive drug would 
fall on the consumers who make that choice. 
 
                                            
48 PBS (2013b) 
Box 5: Ranibizumab, the most expensive drug of all 
The most expensive drug (by total cost) on the entire PBS is 
ranibizumab, which cost over $308 million in 2011-12. It is used 
for treating age-related macular degeneration, and comes in a 
2.3 mg syringe designed for injecting into the eyeball. Currently, 
it costs $1830 before any mark-ups.  
Ranibizumab is manufactured by Genetech, a drug company 
that also makes an anti-cancer drug called bevacizumab 
(Avastin), which comes as a solution that is added to an IV bag. 
Although this drug was designed for another purpose, it appears 
to be just as effective as ranibizumab in preventing macular 
degeneration.49 While bevacizumbab costs $4.30 per mg, 
ranibizumbab costs $795 per mg – 185 times more.  
However, Genetech has little incentive to make bevacizumab 
available in a form that is ready to be injected into the eyeball 
(the most effective means of administration), since it has a far 
more profitable product on the market. This forces doctors to 
divide dosages and fill syringes themselves. 
The new drug pricing board would be able to weigh up the 
evidence on cases such as these and see whether it is worth 
subsidising both drugs. If bevacizumab is as safe and effective 
as the vastly more expensive ranibizumab, the body could use 
the Therapeutic Group Premium to encourage use of the 
cheaper medication. 
                                            
49 Martin, et al. (2012). There is mixed evidence on the long-term comparative 
safety of both drugs – see Schmucker, et al. (2012). 
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Decisions about the relative effectiveness of different drugs 
should be made by the new expert body, acting on clinical 
advice. Therefore we have not made detailed estimates of the 
savings this change would generate. However, we did calculate 
indicative savings from switching to similar drugs used in New 
Zealand when identical drugs were not available. For these 11 
doses alone, the potential savings in Government expenditure is 
estimated at $590 million a year, with potential cumulative 
savings many times this amount.50 
Our estimate does not take into account all of the costs 
associated with expanding the Therapeutic Price Premium. 
These include medical exemptions and out-of-pocket costs for 
patients who choose more expensive drugs. However, the 
estimate is still conservative. Firstly, it only applies to 11 doses. 
Secondly, when more than one alternative was available in New 
Zealand, we based our comparison is based on the most 
expensive substitute (see methodological appendix for more 
information).  
Three reforms that could save $1.8 billion a year 
In summary, this report suggests three changes to how we buy 
drugs (see Box 6). First, establishing an independent pricing 
board with a clear budget. Second, using tougher new rules for 
generic pricing. Third, the new board should consider applying 
the Therapeutic Group Premium to more groups of drugs.  
                                            
50 Clarke and Fitzgerald (2010). 
Box 6: Ending  Australia’s  bad  drug  deal:  the  three  elements  
of pharmaceutical pricing reform 
1. Get the foundations right: independent governance and an 
incentive to save 
2. Tougher rules on generic pricing 
3. Promoting cost-effective choices 
 
If the new pricing body benchmarked PBS prices against the 
three purchasers we looked at (New Zealand and public 
hospitals in two states), the savings would be huge.  
As shown in Figure 13, obtaining better prices for identical 
generics would save nearly $1.2 billion, with savings from 
identical patented drugs representing an extra $100 million. 
Future reforms promoting cost-effective drug use could be 
expected to save over $550 million. Taken together, the three 
reforms would produce total savings of at least $1.8 billion each 
year. Most of these savings come from adopting cheaper 
generic prices (see methodological appendix for further details). 
These estimates are conservative for a number of reasons. 
First, we have only analysed 73 doses, accounting for less than 
half of PBS expenditure. Second, we have only benchmarked 
prices against three purchasers. If more countries and states 
were included, the savings would certainly be greater. Third, we 
have assumed that current PBS pack sizes, mark-ups and 
dispensing fees remain the same – adopting New Zealand 
mark-ups and pack sizes would generate further savings. 
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Finally, we used conservative assumptions when substituting 
different doses and drugs (see the methodological appendix for 
more details).  
Figure 13: Total savings under benchmarking model, 2011-12 
 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis 
Savings for patients 
As well as achieving significant savings for the Government, 
lower prices from benchmarking would make a big difference for 
patients. For 40 of the drug doses we looked at, adopting 
benchmark prices would result in lower retail prices for patients 
who  don’t have a concession card, and who are below the 
Safety Net. In 15 cases, the saving is more than $10 for each 
box of medicine. It is more than $20 for six drugs, including 
atorvastatin (see Figure 14). These figures only include identical 
drugs.  
Figure 14: Patient savings per pack (non-concessional patients), 
based on benchmark prices, selected doses, 2011-12 
 
Note: Atorvastatin figure is average of savings for 10, 20, 40 and 80 mg doses. Less 
than $3.60 separates the cost of the highest and lowest-price doses. Other doses have 
not been averaged and are listed separately above. 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis 
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These changes are significant, and will raise concerns about 
their possible impact. The next chapter considers these 
concerns, and outlines a phased approach to changing how the 
PBS purchases drugs in Australia. 
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6.  Possible concerns
Any change brings risks, but concerns about lower drug prices 
are often overstated. Even when real risks are involved, they 
can be mitigated by designing changes the right way.  
Three concerns regularly come up when reducing drug prices 
has been considered here and overseas:  
 access to drugs 
 investment in research and development and 
 pharmacy income. 
Access to pharmaceuticals 
In New Zealand, fewer drugs are subsidised and new drugs 
take longer to be listed.51 The recommendations in this report 
have been designed to avoid these problems. We do not 
propose  adopting  New  Zealand’s  sole-supplier tendering model, 
where typically only one brand is available for each drug.  
Although  some  of  New  Zealand’s  price  advantage  may  come  
from sole-supply arrangements (and associated reductions in 
sales and marketing costs) this cannot account for all of the 
price gap between PBS and New Zealand prices, or the low 
prices in Australian state public hospitals.  
                                            
51 Wonder and Milne (2011)  
Sole-supplier tendering limits choice for patients, who might 
prefer to use a brand they are used to. By benchmarking, 
Australia can pay prices close to those in countries that use 
sole-supplier tendering (and countries that use other models 
which work well) without reducing the choices available to 
patients.   
Australia doesn’t  need  to  introduce  sole-supplier tendering to 
get  lower  drug  prices.  However,  bringing  Australia’s  prices  
closer  to  New  Zealand’s  might  still  raise  fears  that  drugs  won’t  
be as widely available as they are now. Access could fall for two 
reasons. First, drug companies might refuse to supply drugs 
because lower prices make it unprofitable. Second, a capped 
national drug budget may mean there is not enough funding to 
buy the current volume and range of drugs.52 
To address the first of these fears, Australia could phase in 
reforms, starting with changes that have little or no risk of 
reducing access to drugs (see Figure 15).  
The bulk of estimated savings come from adopting lower prices 
for identical drugs that are sold to the PBS, as well as to 
PHARMAC or Australian public hospitals. By definition, 
benchmarking will not bring prices below profitable levels paid 
                                            
52 It has also been suggested that limiting the number of suppliers will increase 
the risk of breaches of the supply chain (e.g. if manufacturing from one plant is 
closed). Our proposals (and savings) do not rely on consolidating supply of 
generics to one manufacturer. 
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elsewhere, so there is little risk of companies withdrawing drugs 
from the market.  
Further, risks to access are particularly low for the first wave of 
price changes: cuts in generic prices. Our generic drug prices 
are high to start with, and a cut of at least 50 per cent below 
originator prices, while large, is lower than those required 
elsewhere. Any drug manufacturer can make generic drugs, so 
refusal to produce them at competitive prices would simply 
result in losing market share.  
Figure 15: A timeline for proposed reforms 
 
Source: Grattan Institute 
Later reforms would not have to limit access to drugs either. 
Applying the Therapeutic Group Premium to a wider range of 
drugs (starting from 2016-17) would still leave patients able to 
choose a more expensive drug if they were willing to pay the 
difference. If there were medical grounds for this choice, they 
could buy the drug at the same price as the cheaper drug. 
If the national drug budget is managed sensibly, there is no 
reason why it needs to cut off access to new drugs. New 
Zealand’s  drug budget is set each year. It can be adjusted to 
respond to changes in population health, the development of 
new drugs, and changes in government finances. If the drug 
budget is too low, an argument can be made to increase it as 
part of the Budget process.  
From 2000 to 2012, the New Zealand drug budget increased by 
more than 15 per cent in real terms.53 At the same time, access 
to pharmaceuticals increased, partly thanks to falling prices. On 
average, prescriptions for seven important groups of drugs 
increased almost six-fold (four are shown in Figure 16). 
Setting a drug budget will provide a clear target. It will ensure 
decisions are made about priorities: how much should be spent 
and what it should be spent on. However, the budget is not set 
in stone – if risks of reduced access to drugs emerge, the 
budget can be revised. Setting the wrong target is a risk, but it is 
no excuse for not setting a target at all. 
As with the adequacy of the annual drug budget, the new pricing 
board should review listing times for new drugs regularly to 
                                            
53 See Figure 11 above.  
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make sure long delays do not occur here. Provision might also 
be made for an exceptional circumstances fund, such as the 
one PHARMAC has established, where doctors could apply for 
drugs on behalf of a particular patient.  
Figure 16: Prescriptions per capita for four groups of drugs, New 
Zealand, 1993-2012 
 
Notes: Population-adjusted consumption of all the other groups of drugs where 
information was available also increased: antipsychotics (89%), antidepressants (216%) 
and sleeping pills (35%). 
Source: Adapted from PHARMAC (2013) 
Finally, it is important to note that the reforms suggested in this 
report will increase access to drugs. Lower prices will reduce 
the cost barriers that keep some people from filling prescriptions 
their doctors consider necessary. Lower prices will also free up 
money to add expensive, but potentially life-saving drugs to the 
PBS – drugs which are not listed now. 
Research and development in Australia 
Calls to cut drug prices often provoke warnings of potential 
declines in local research and development. There have been 
claims that pharmaceutical research has fallen in New Zealand, 
with  some  blaming  PHARMAC’s  pricing  and  listing  policies.  54 
Yet a study found that clinical trials have actually increased in 
New Zealand since PHARMAC was created.55  
Most major drug companies are global, with research activities 
spread throughout the world. They base decisions on where to 
undertake research on many factors, including cost, population 
characteristics (which are important for clinical trials), and the 
relevant skills, research infrastructure and regulation in different 
countries. 
Drug prices  don’t  determine  whether  a  country  is  a  good  place  
to do research and development. There is no evidence that local 
drug prices influence decisions about where research and 
development occurs.56 Further, the bulk of savings identified in 
this report come from reduced prices for generic drugs, which 
no longer have a research and development premium. 
                                            
54 See Sundakov and Sundakov (2005) (a report funded by a pharmaceutical 
company) for an example of this claim. 
55 From 70 in 1998-99 to 113 in 2008-09, Lockhart, et al. (2010). The authors 
acknowledge two limitations: that these data describe planned, not executed, 
trials and less information was available for the period 1998-99. 
56 Light and Lexchin (2005) compared pharmaceutical research activities and 
local drug prices in eight countries and found no significant relationship. 
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For these reasons, justifying inflated drug prices as a way to 
attract research and development is irrational. Paying higher 
prices in the hope that the money will trickle down to research 
and development is indirect, costly, and most likely ineffective.  
Concerns about the future of pharmaceutical research and 
development in Australia are understandable. Australian 
research is currently focused on clinical trials, not basic 
research or drug discovery (see Figure 17). This makes 
Australia vulnerable to competition from countries that can 
conduct clinical trials more cheaply.57 Although these risks are 
real, high drug prices are the wrong way to address them. 
Australia is an attractive destination for some kinds of research 
and development, and we punch well above our weight in 
medical research.58 In the past, the Government has provided 
specific research and development funding for the 
pharmaceutical industry.59 Direct support of this kind, or 
investments in human capital and research infrastructure, are 
                                            
57 See Commonwealth of Australia (2009). Pharmaceutical manufacturing 
faces similar risks. Rationalisation of global supply chains and increasing 
competition from lower-cost countries has caused cuts in employment and 
plant capacity, Lev (2012). As is the case for research and development, these 
drivers are far more important than Australian pharmaceutical prices. 
58 Department of Health and Ageing (2012). Australia is not as strong in 
research in pharmacology, toxicity and pharmaceuticals – see Office of the 
Chief Scientist (2013). 
59 See Commonwealth of Australia (2009) for background on industry support 
provided since 1988. 
more likely to attract investment than indirect measures of 
doubtful effectiveness.60 
Figure 17: Types of pharmaceutical research and development, 
Australia and USA, 2008 
 
Lower  drug  prices  won’t  necessarily  mean  lower  research  and  
development in Australia, but they will mean lower 
pharmaceutical company profits.  
At an international level, profits are linked to research and 
development expenditure.61 As a result, cutting Australian drug 
                                            
60 Direct support can also drive research towards the most clinically effective 
treatments, which are not always the most profitable. 
61 For a summary of the empirical literature on the link between 
pharmaceutical profits and research and development spending see OECD 
(2011). 
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prices might have a marginal impact on total, global 
pharmaceutical research. However, this impact would be very 
small. Investing the savings from lower drug prices in better 
healthcare, access to more drugs, in other services, or in tax 
reductions would almost certainly create a bigger positive 
impact. If reduced research and development is a concern, 
some of the savings from lower prices could be used to support 
research and development directly. 
Lower income for retail pharmacies 
Retail pharmacies incur the costs of buying, handling, storing 
and dispensing medications, providing advice, and the costs of 
operating their stores. The PBS subsidises retail pharmacies by 
paying a mark-up on the wholesale cost of drugs, and a 
dispensing fee (see Table 1, Methodological appendix).62  
In the Australian system, higher drug prices typically generate 
higher incomes for pharmacies at a cost to government. But 
when prices fall below the maximum copayment ($36.10), a 
clause in the Fifth Community Pharmacy Agreement allows 
pharmacies to charge additional fees of up to $5.22 directly to 
general patients. This will offset some of the impact of lower 
drug prices on pharmacy income.63  
                                            
62 Medicare (2012); Department of Health and Ageing and the Pharmacy Guild 
of Australia (2010).  
63 This  provision,  according  to  the  PBS,  was  “introduced to contain costs to the 
consumer, compensate the pharmacist and ensure that prescriptions for 
medicines priced less than the co-payment amount of $36.10 are still 
recordable on the Prescription Record Form for Safety Net recording 
Overall, matching lower New Zealand drug prices for identical 
drugs would reduce subsidies to pharmacies by about $105 
million a year under current funding arrangements. This is 
because some of the retail pharmacy mark-up is based on the 
wholesale price of drugs (see the methodological appendix for 
more  detail).  For  Australia’s  5,270  retail  pharmacies,  this  would  
result in an average loss of income of around $20,000.64  
In addition, pharmacies would lose much of the excess revenue 
they make from manufacturer discounts below published prices. 
It is important to note that this windfall income was not intended 
when PBS prices were agreed.  The  Government’s  price  
disclosure policy (discussed above) was brought in specifically 
to combat excess profit from manufacturer discounts. 
Many of the fixed costs of operating a pharmacy would remain 
unchanged, and so retail pharmacy profits are likely to be 
reduced, although this will vary by pharmacy and we did not 
estimate the impact of lower prices on profits. 
Currently, the Government negotiates the framework for 
subsidising retail pharmacies with the Pharmacy Guild of 
Australia. When this agreement is renegotiated (it expires in 
2015), a new way of funding and regulating pharmacies should 
be discussed.  
                                                                                  
purposes.”  The  fee  itself does not count towards the Safety Net, and the 
pharmacist can charge it at their discretion. See PBS (2013a) 
64 This is around 8.5% of the total subsidies to pharmacists each year. Based 
on IBISWorld (2012); Department of Health and Ageing and the Pharmacy 
Guild of Australia (2010). 
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With current mark-ups, higher drug prices generally mean much 
higher retail pharmacy income. Mark-ups should be changed so 
that  pharmacies  don’t  have  such  a  strong  incentive  to  keep  
prices high. There also appears to be little justification for the 
policy of charging extra fees when prices are below the $36.10 
maximum co-payment.  
If the Government wanted to protect retail pharmacy profitability 
while cutting drug prices, it could change the balance of the 
dispensing fee, mark-up and other support payments. This 
could be done in a way that ensured continued access to 
pharmaceuticals, especially in smaller, rural communities. 
Regulatory arrangements in larger centres should also be 
reviewed to harness the benefits of a more competitive market 
in those locations.65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
65 Wilkinson (2000); Barnes (2011) 
Box 7: Myths about reducing drug prices 
Drug  companies  won’t  provide  drugs  at  lower  prices – 
people  won’t  be  able  to  get  the  drugs  they  need 
Benchmarking will not take prices below profitable levels that 
drug companies already sell at elsewhere. For generics, many 
companies are willing to compete at prices which are a fraction 
of what the PBS pays now. Companies selling to New Zealand 
and to Australian public hospitals are making money, and yet 
the PBS pays nearly six times as much for identical drugs.  
Sole-supplier tendering will disrupt supply and limit patient 
choice 
This report does not propose sole-supplier tendering. With 
benchmarking, multiple companies could sell to the PBS, 
maintaining choice and reliable supply. 
Lower drug prices hinder research and development 
Drug companies need income to fund research and 
development and to recoup the costs of getting a drug to 
market. However, most savings in this report come from generic 
drugs, which no longer have a research and development 
premium. Most drug companies are multinational and do not 
base their research decisions on local drug prices. Paying 
higher prices in the hope that the money will trickle down to 
research is irrational and most likely ineffective.  
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Conclusion
In the 1940s and 1950s, Australia led the world by introducing 
the  PBS  to  give  the  public  access  to  ‘life-saving’  drugs.  Australia  
was also an international innovator in the 1990s, introducing 
assessment of drug cost-effectiveness before listing. Today, we 
have lost this position of leadership. Our drug prices are high by 
international standards, and the way we set them is to blame.  
We should take two initial steps to improve our pricing process. 
These solutions have been proven overseas and can be 
introduced now. We should start by reversing the politics. In 
other words, political choices should determine the overall drug 
budget, but not the value of individual drugs at the end of the 
process. An independent board of experts, with a defined, 
indexed budget, should set prices. As well, the price of new 
generics should be no more than half the price of the originator, 
with  annual  benchmarking  against  the  world’s  best  prices. 
These changes would cut wasteful spending by at least $1.3 
billion a year. In future, the new pricing body can consider a 
third change: encouraging people to use more cost-effective 
drugs. This could include applying the Therapeutic Group 
Premium policy to more groups of drugs, which might save well 
over $550 million each year. 
Future Grattan Institute reports will look at other types of waste 
in the health system. However, of all the types of waste we will 
look at, high drug prices are the easiest to remedy. This should 
be our first priority in making our health system more efficient.  
Lower drug prices will help relieve pressure on both government 
and household budgets. The pricing agreement between the 
Government and the drug companies expires in the middle of 
2014. Commitment to reform should be made as soon as 
possible. A new pricing body should be set up well before then 
to negotiate fairer prices as soon as possible. 
The  waste  caused  by  Australia’s  bad  drug  deal  is  immense.  The  
amount wasted every day is almost beyond comprehension: 
$3.5 million. Particularly when government budgets are under 
pressure, and demand for health care is rising, this money could 
be much better spent. 
Figure 18: Current and proposed pricing decision processes 
 
Source: Grattan Institute 
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Methodological appendix
This report estimates potential savings from reduced drug prices 
by comparing PBS prices with three benchmarks: prices from the 
New Zealand Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC) 
and the public hospital purchasers in Western Australia and an 
unnamed Australian state. 
The PBS lists an ex-manufacturer  price  per  ‘box’  of  medicines  – 
for example, the cost for a box of 30 tablets, a vial of eye drops or 
a pack of 5 pre-filled insulin syringes. This price per  ‘box’  
(adjusted for differences in the other jurisdictions) was used to 
estimate savings. 
There are two broad sets of choices involved in comparing drug 
prices between nations or purchasers: which drugs should be 
compared and which prices should be used. 
Which drugs? 
The Department of Health and Ageing publishes extensive 
information about the PBS.66 The starting point for the 
comparisons was lists of the 50 most frequently prescribed and 50 
most expensive (in terms of total expenditure) drugs on the PBS 
in 2011-12. There was considerable overlap between the two lists. 
Two drugs were excluded as there were no equivalents in New 
Zealand’s  prescription  formulary.67 The lists were combined into a 
                                            
66 PBS (2012) 
67 These were fingolimod, used in the treatment of multiple sclerosis, and 
ranibizumab, an intravitreal injection for macular degeneration. Neither drug was 
used in the public hospitals of the states we compared. 
single  ‘top  73’  list.  Taken  together,  these  73  drugs  accounted for 
45 per cent of total PBS prescriptions and 43 per cent of total PBS 
expenditure – $3.9 out of $9.1 billion in 2011-12.  
Identical drugs 
Of the top 73 drugs, there were 55 identical drugs on the 
PHARMAC schedule. This figure includes drugs where there were 
differences in dosage – for instance where the PBS-listed 
irbesartan tablets had 300 mg of the active ingredient and the 
PHARMAC tablets had 100 mg. We adjusted the New Zealand 
ex-manufacturer price to correct for these differences on a cost 
per mg basis.  
The list of 55 identical drugs includes four instances where 
Australia’s  listing  was  for  a  ‘modified  release’  tablet  and  New  
Zealand’s  was not. For three other medications – clopidogrel with 
aspirin and two separate dosages of budesonide with eformoterol 
fumarate – New Zealand listed the components separately; this 
report combined the costs of the two components for a 
comparison.  
An additional seven medications were combination drugs for 
which there was an equivalent medication on the PHARMAC 
schedule, but in a different ratio to that on the PBS. When 
comparing these medications, we adjusted the New Zealand 
dosage of the first-listed medication. For example, the PBS lists 
irbesartan with hydrochlorothiazide as a tablet with 300 mg of 
irbesartan and 12.5 mg hydrochlorothiazide, while the PHARMAC 
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listing has a ratio of 50 mg to 12.5 mg respectively. In this case 
we multiplied the New Zealand ex-manufacturer price by 6 (300 ÷ 
50). This was a conservative approach which will overstate the 
price of the New Zealand substitute (which only used 12.5 mg of 
hydrochlorothiaziade).  
For the public hospital comparison, only identical drugs were 
compared – 39 in Western Australia and 59 in the other state.68  
Substituting drugs 
11 drugs listed on the PBS were not available on the PHARMAC 
schedule. In this case, other drugs in the same therapeutic class 
were compared. Choice of the alternative medication was based 
on Australian Medicines Handbook or the Therapeutic 
Guidelines.69 This analysis does not examine relative potency of 
the substitutes (for example, substituting atorvastatin for 
rosuvastatin) and so should be regarded as an indicative 
comparison only,  as  not  all  substitutes  will  be  ‘equivalent’  
therapeutically. Substitutes were based on the nearest matched 
dosage – for instance, a 40 mg tablet with another 40 mg tablet in 
the same therapeutic class. 
In some cases, there were several possible substitutes in New 
Zealand. In each case the analysis substituted the most 
expensive option available in New Zealand. This makes the 
analysis more conservative, as sometimes these substitutes were 
many times more expensive than alternatives. We also corrected 
                                            
68 Contracts WA (2012) 
69 Therapeutic Guidelines Limited (2012); Rossi S (Ed.) (2013) 
for difference in strength or volume between substitute 
medications.  
Packaging differences – i.e the number of tablets per pack – were 
standardized to the Australian pack in the calculations. The New 
Zealand formulary generally provides larger quantities per 
prescription – an average of three times as many pills per script. 
Adopting these larger volumes would further increase savings by 
reducing transaction costs and pharmacy mark-ups, but these 
savings were not included in our calculations.  
Which prices? 
The full cost of providing a drug consists of payments at a number 
of points of the supply chain including the ex-manufacturer price, 
a wholesale mark-up, a retail mark up and a dispensing fee.  
Table 1 summarises  the  relationship  between  the  manufacturer’s  
price and the dispensing price in Australia and New Zealand. In 
both New Zealand and Australia, pharmacy revenue includes a 
mark-up based on the ex-manufacturer price. A corollary of this is 
that if the ex-manufacturer price is reduced, payments to 
pharmacies reduce and further savings accrue.  
Under  Australia’s  Fifth Community Pharmacy Agreement, 
pharmacists are allowed to charge additional fees of up to $5.22 
when a medication costs less than the $36.10 maximum co-
payment. However, these fees cannot raise the total dispensed 
price above the $36.10 maximum co-payment. For example, if a 
drug costs $31.50 including the dispensing fee, the pharmacist 
can charge an additional $4.60 to the patient, bringing the total 
cost to the patient to $36.10.  
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Table 1: Dispensed prices formulae, Australia and New Zealand 
 Australia ($AUD) New Zealand ($NZD) 
Maximum cost 
to the retail 
pharmacy 
(wholesale 
mark-up) 
Ex manufacturer price (EMP) 
+ 
Whole sale Cost: 
<$930: EMP + 7.52% 
>$930: EMP + $70 
Ex Manufacturer Price 
(NZEMP) 
Retail 
pharmacy 
mark-up 
≤ $30.00: 15% 
$ 30.01 – $45.00: $4.50 
$ 45.01 - $180.00: 10% 
$ 180.01 – 450.00: $18.00 
$ 450.01 to $1750.00: 4% 
>$1750: $70.00 
<$150: 4% 
>$150: 5% 
Dispensing 
fees 
Ready prepared $6.52 Ready prepared $5.30  
Extra fees 
(paid by 
general 
patients) 
These fees are 
added (at the 
pharmacy’s  
discretion) to 
medications 
below the co-
pay. The total 
cost cannot 
exceed 
$36.10. 
If total cost is below co-
payment of $36.10: 
 
Safety Net Recording Fee: 
$1.11 
Allowable Extra Fee: $4.11 
(Total extra fees to patient: 
$5.22) 
 
Source: PHARMAC (2012b) Department of Health and Ageing and the Pharmacy Guild of 
Australia (2010) 
 
Dispensing fees vary both in New Zealand and Australia – drugs 
that require preparation or are dangerous attract a higher 
dispensing  fee.  This  analysis  used  the  ‘ready  prepared’  
dispensing fee for both New Zealand and Australia.70  
The PBS schedule effective from 1 December 2012 to 31 
December 2012 was used to identify the quantity per script. The 
ex-manufacturer prices were taken from the most recent official 
ex-manufacturer price list available from the PBS website, that 
effective from 1 October 2012. As a result, this analysis does not 
include any price reductions that came into force after 1 October 
2012.71 
An example of the raw data available for the PBS is shown in 
Table 2.  
Table 2: Example of raw drug data 
Drug Form Volume Total  
Cost 
Average 
price 
Atorvastatin Tablet 40 mg 3,801,902 $294,966,163 $77.58 
 
Average price sometimes is higher than the dispensed price 
multiplied by volume. The atorvastatin listed in Table 2 currently 
                                            
70 New Zealand has recently changed some aspects of its pharmaceutical pricing 
under the 2012 Combined Pharmacy Services Agreement. District Health 
Boards now form agreements with community pharmacies on dispensing fees. 
However the assumption of a $5.30 dispensing fee remains a reasonable proxy 
for the overall rates, although there will be some regional variation. PHARMAC 
(2013), personal communication.  
71 See p 9 for price reductions in atorvastatin. There was also a price reduction 
for rosuvastatin in December 2012. 
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retails for $67.54 per box, while the average price was $77.58. 
One explanation for this is that doctors may prescribe multiple 
packs per script. Another explanation is that price reductions (see 
discussion in Chapter 4) could have occurred over the year and 
led to lower prices. To test this, we conducted a regression of the 
difference in ex-manufacturer price from 2011 to 2012, against the 
average cost as multiples of the dispensed price. This regression 
showed that the change in total cost was essentially explained by 
the change in listed prices, rather than other factors such as 
changes in prescribing volumes (R2=.80). 
Rather than calculate our savings based on total cost as listed by 
the PBS, we used prescription volume multiplied by dispensed 
price. Because our price data are from the end of 2011-12, they 
take into account the effect of price reductions throughout that 
financial year.  
Calculating price comparisons 
To make fair comparisons between the three jurisdictions studied, 
it is important to note differences between their prices and the 
PBS prices. 
New Zealand 
The ex-manufacturer price for drugs and maximum quantity of 
medications for New Zealand were drawn from the PHARMAC 
schedule from December 2012. Because of the extent of 
exposure of both Australian and New Zealand drug supply to 
international markets, the ex-manufacturer price from the 
PHARMAC schedule was converted to Australian dollars using 
the Reserve  Bank’s  average  monthly exchange rate for 
December, when the PHARMAC schedule was set: $1 AUD = 
$1.2608 NZD.  
The pharmacy mark up and dispensing fees were converted to 
Australian dollars using Purchasing Power Parities, with the New 
Zealand dollar almost on par with the Australian dollar on that 
basis (1.0196). This reflects the fact that mark-ups are a 
component of pharmacy income, which unlike pharmaceuticals, is 
not internationally traded.  
PHARMAC has negotiated discounts of over 17 per cent of total 
PHARMAC expenditure on its published prices but these are not 
publicly attributed to individual items.72 As the drugs subject to 
discounts are not publicly identified, we have not taken these 
discounts into account. Similarly, we did not have access to 
information on Australian price discounts negotiated outside the 
official price (these are generally secret arrangements between 
pharmaceutical companies and the PBS) and so any discounts 
have not been taken into account. 
 
                                            
72 PHARMAC (2012c) 
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States 
For the state public hospital comparisons, we used confidential 
price data provided to us by one state, as well as the Western 
Australian contract prices, which are publicly listed. In both cases, 
we treated the public hospital purchaser contract price as 
equivalent to an ex-manufacturer price.  
In order to estimate savings from adopting these prices, we 
applied the PBS mark-up formulae and dispensing fees. As prices 
were in Australian dollars already, no conversion was required. 
Models and aggregate savings 
Aggregate savings were derived by calculating the difference in 
cost per box multiplied by the total number of prescriptions under 
the PBS in 2011-12.  
Savings =  
(Australian dispensed price[2012] - comparator dispensed 
price)  
x Australian script volume[2011-12] 
As prescription volumes are rising over time, this leads to an 
underestimate of savings in future years.  
We did not have data on the proportion of concession patients on 
each drug. Therefore, we could not estimate aggregate savings to 
patients and to Government separately.  
 
Results 
New Zealand comparison 
A range of options for estimating savings from adoption of the 
PHARMAC pricing were modelled, only three of which are 
presented here. All start by adjusting the New Zealand ex-
manufacturer price by the exchange rate. 
Model A – generates the highest savings estimate  
 Apply New Zealand mark-ups (purchasing power parity 
adjusted) 
 Adopt New Zealand prices only for drugs that are cheaper in 
New Zealand 
Model B – model used in report 
 Apply Australian mark-ups 
 Adopt New Zealand prices only for drugs that are cheaper in 
New Zealand  
Model C – generates lowest savings estimate 
 Apply Australian mark-ups 
 Adopt New Zealand prices for all drugs 
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State public hospital purchaser comparison 
Two scenarios were modelled to assess savings from adopting 
public hospital purchaser prices: firstly adopting their prices for all 
drugs, and secondly only using their prices when cheaper than 
the PBS (preferred scenario). In both scenarios we applied full 
retail pharmacy mark-ups. Models for both states generated 
significant savings on cheaper generics, rather than patented 
drugs. With PBS mark-ups, several patented drugs were just as – 
or more – expensive in both systems we compared.  
Table 4: Savings from national adoption of public hospital prices 
 
  Savings from 
generic drugs 
($m) 
Savings from 
Patented 
drugs ($m) 
Total 
($m) 
Unnamed 
state 
All Drugs 1,111 67 1,178 
Cheaper 
Drugs Only 
1,111 76 1,186 
Western 
Australia 
All Drugs 741 -11 730 
Cheaper 
Drugs Only 
754 0 754 
Note: numbers do not sum due to rounding 
 
 
 
 
Favoured model: use cheapest drugs from each jurisdiction 
Lastly, we compared the cheapest price for every drug, with 
Australian mark-ups in the three comparison jurisdictions. This 
approach is consistent with our recommendation for regular 
international benchmarking. The results of the benchmark model 
can be seen in Tables 5 and 6. The total savings from this were 
slightly less than Model A because that model used the much 
lower New Zealand mark-ups. 
 Use cheapest price from Western Australia, New Zealand, and 
the unnamed state 
 Apply Australian mark-ups to all drugs 
Table 5: Comparing prices for atorvastatin 40 mg with Australian 
markups 
Jurisdiction Ex-
manufacturer 
price 
Quantity  $AU/box 
(adjusted 
for 
quantity) 
 
Dispensed 
price ($AU) 
 
PBS 51.59 30  51.59 67.54  
NZ 5.72 90  1.91 8.88  
WA 4.44 30  4.44 12.01  
Other  
state 
2.30 30  2.30 9.61  
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Table 6: Savings from benchmarking model 
 Generic ($m) Patented ($m) Total ($m) 
Identical 1,159 126 1, 285 
Substitutes 50 520 570* 
Total 1,209 646 1,835 
 
*Note: this figure has been rounded down to $ 550 million in the report.  
 
In many cases, New Zealand was marginally cheaper than the 
unnamed state. This led to most of the savings coming from 
adopting New Zealand prices (with Australian mark-ups) (see 
Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Number of cheapest doses in each jurisdiction 
 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis 
Using  the  ‘benchmark’  model  of  the  cheapest  drugs  available  in  
each jurisdiction, savings on identical drugs would amount to $1.3 
billion a year. Including substitutes, the potential savings are 
closer to $1.8 billion. Figure 20 summarises the potential savings 
under the different models described in this appendix.  
Figure 20: Savings generated by cheapest drugs in all jurisdictions 
(with current mark-ups) against models A, B and C  
 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis 
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